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ABSTRACT
Biases in reasoning can provide insight into underlying processing mechanisms. We demonstrate
a new bias in children’s belief-desire reasoning. Six-year-old children were told a story in which
a character is mistaken about which of three boxes contains some object. The character wants to
go to one of the boxes, but only if it does not contain the object. In this scenario the character
should avoid the box where she falsely believes the object to be, but might go to either of the
remaining boxes. Though the character is equally likely to go to either box, children were biased
to predict that the character would go to the box that contained the object. In a control task, the
character had the same desire but did not have a false belief; in this case, children showed no
bias, choosing each of  the two correct answers equally. The observed pattern of bias was
predicted by a developmental model of belief-desire reasoning. Competent belief-desire
reasoning depends on a process of selection-by-inhibition in which the best belief content
emerges from a set of candidates.3
Competent social interaction depends on the ability to recognize and reason about people’s
mental states (what Premack and Woodruff (1978) termed ‘theory of mind’). One cardinal
component of this ability is the prediction of another person’s action from that person’s beliefs
and desires. A key advance in investigating this ability was the development of the false belief
(FB)  task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and the discovery that belief-desire reasoning is well
established before a child goes to school (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). In a standard
version of the FB task, children are told about a girl, Sally, who sees a frog under a red box, but
is absent when the frog moves to under a blue box. Following basic control questions, children
must answer either a Think Question, about where Sally thinks the frog is, or an Action
Question, about where Sally will look for the frog. Both questions have the same answer: Sally
did not see the frog switch locations and so she mistakenly thinks that it is still under the red
box, and will look for it there. We refer to the red box as the False Belief Location (FB-
Location) because by indicating this location the child correctly attributes a false belief to Sally.
We refer to the green box as the True Belief (TB-Location) because by indicating this location
the child incorrectly attributes a true belief to Sally. A large number of studies consistently show
that  most children aged three years fail both questions (by indicating the blue box) but at four
years most children pass (see Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001 for review). 
Most investigations of children’s performance on the FB task have sought to identify the
age at which children first attribute false belief, and until recently there has been little concern
for discovering the processing mechanisms underlying successful performance. However,
following the proposals of Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, and Tidswell (1991) and of Leslie and
Thaiss (1992) that success on the FB task might require inhibition, researchers have turned to
investigate the relationship between inhibitory processing and belief-desire reasoning (e.g.4
Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; Roth & Leslie, 1998). In this
paper we test between two detailed models of how inhibitory processing leads to success in FB
tasks.  Both models hold that success on FB tasks involves selecting between representations of
alternative belief contents by inhibiting competitors.
Young children engage in belief-desire reasoning when their general knowledge and
general reasoning powers are still severely limited. These contrasting abilities have led to the
suggestion that the early capacity for belief-desire reasoning has an automatic, heuristic basis.
Specifically, Leslie and colleagues have proposed that the young brain is equipped with a
specialized 'theory of mind' mechanism (ToMM) that enables mental states to be attended to and
learned about (Leslie, 1987, 2000). This proposed mechanism has a degree of neural
specialization (Frith & Frith, 1999; Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991; Gallagher & Frith, 2003;
Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff & Frith, 2002) and is present in children independently of general
intellectual level (Leslie, 1987). Impairment of this mechanism may occur in certain complex
genetic disorders, such as autism, with severe impact on social development (Baron-Cohen,
1995; Leslie, 1987; Leslie & Frith, 1990).
In the FB task, the role of ToMM is to ‘guess’ plausible and relevant beliefs that might
be attributed to Sally. ToMM may make more than one guess, but one of these guesses should be
that Sally believes what  is true, (where ‘true’ reflects one’s own belief). This may be a useful
heuristic because people’s beliefs about mundane things usually are true. But solving a FB task
requires us to ignore our own ‘true’ belief. In order to ignore the ‘true’ belief, it must be
inhibited, allowing the appropriate ‘false’ belief to be selected for attribution. The process of
selection-by-inhibition is referred to as ‘selection processing’ (Leslie, 2000; Leslie & Thaiss,
1992; Roth & Leslie, 1998). 5
In a standard FB task, Sally wants to approach the object (for example, she wants to find
the frog). In an avoidance desire FB task, Sally wants to avoid the frog and will, therefore, avoid
the box in which she falsely believes it to be (FB-Location) and mistakenly go the true belief
location (TB-Location) where the frog actually is. Cassidy (1998) found that an avoidance FB
task is much more difficult than a standard FB task. Four-year-olds who passed the standard task
failed the avoidance FB task, performing like three-year-olds. Leslie and Polizzi (1998) obtained
very similar results and proposed two models of selection processing, either of which could
account for the results. Table 1 summarizes the ages at which children typically pass and fail
approach and avoidance FB tasks. We will now briefly describe the two models of selection
processing and then describe how we tested between them.
Table 1 about here
Two models of belief-desire reasoning
The basic idea behind both models is that, in attributing beliefs to other people, an unconscious
“theory of mind mechanism” (ToMM) automatically provides a small set of belief contents that
might plausibly be attributed. Then, an attentional/decision process in the brain — selection
processing — selects the most plausible content from this set. These ideas are reminiscent of
certain approaches to the role of inhibition in visual attention (e.g., Klein, 1988; Posner &
Cohen, 1984; Watson & Humphreys, 2000). 
The selection process can be visualized as involving a mental pointer or index, which is
attracted to the currently most salient content. Both models share the following assumptions:
1. The salience of contents varies by degree and contents can have their salience decreased by
inhibition.6
2. Among the contents, there is always one which is true, the ‘true-belief content’. Initially the
true belief content is most salient.
3. For success in a FB task, the true-belief content must be inhibited so that its salience falls
below that of the false-belief content; otherwise a true-belief will be attributed. 
4. Predicting the behavior of a character with an avoidance desire requires first identifying
(indexing) the target to be avoided and then inhibiting that target so that it will be avoided. 
In both models, predicting a character’s behavior requires one inhibition in approach FB
tasks, but two inhibitions in avoidance FB tasks. The models differ from one another in three
main respects: first, in whether selection is done serially or in parallel; second, in how many
selection indexes are used; and third, when predicting action in an avoidance FB task, in how the
desire and belief inhibitions combine. 
In model 1, “inhibition of inhibition”, there is only a single index and inhibitions apply in
parallel. When predicting where Sally will go in an avoidance FB task, the target of true belief
(and approach desire) — the TB-Location — is indexed first. Because Sally’s belief is false and
her desire is to avoid the frog, two inhibitions are required, and are applied such that they cancel
out by inhibiting each other. The end result is that the TB-Location remains indexed, and is
correctly selected as the location where Sally will go. Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the operation
of Model 1.
In Model 2, “inhibition of return,” two indexes are used, one for belief and one for desire.
Furthermore, inhibitions are applied serially, with belief inhibitions applied first and desire
inhibitions second. To predict where Sally will go in an avoidance FB task, the target of true
belief is again initially indexed. Because Sally’s belief is false, the first of the serial inhibitions is
applied, causing the belief index to move to the FB-Location. Next, the target of desire is7
identified, its index being attracted to the FB-Location (because it is more salient). However,
because Sally’s desire is to avoid the target, the desire index must be inhibited. For a successful
prediction, the desire inhibition must be sufficient to lower the salience of the FB-Location
below even that of the previously inhibited TB-Location. Panel B of Figure 1 depicts the
operation of Model 2.
Figure 1 about here 
Testing between the models
These models were developed to account for two-location tasks in which there is a single correct
answer. Avoidance FB tasks, however, can be devised to have two (or more) equally correct
answers by having three (or more) locations. If Sally believes (falsely) that the frog is in one box
and she wants to avoid it, she might equally well go to either of two remaining locations, one of
which contains the frog and the other of which does not. When we examined the models in the
context of this three-location task, we found that they made opposite predictions about which
correct answer would be preferred. We can therefore use such tasks to test the models. In a task
with two equally correct answers, subjects might choose both answers equally often or they
might show a systematic bias to one of the answers. Biases in reasoning can be used to probe
underlying processing mechanisms (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If subjects choose each
correct answer equally often, then both models will be refuted; if, however, subjects systematic-
ally select one of the answers, then one model will be refuted and the other supported. Figure 2
illustrates the action-prediction generated by each model in a three-location task.
Figure 2 about here
For model 1, the addition of a third Neutral-Location makes no difference because the
canceling out of inhibitions leaves the TB-Location as the preferred answer. For model 2,8
however, the addition of a third Neutral-Location means that there is a correct answer that does
not require the index to move to a previously inhibited location. Assuming that a target that has
never been inhibited will be more salient than targets that have, the non-inhibited Neutral-
Location should attract the desire index and will therefore be the preferred answer.
Experiment
The above predictions are made only for successful performance. Therefore, to test these
predictions, we studied children who can pass avoidance FB. Pilot studies indicated that 6-year
olds can have a high rate of success with avoidance FB. One group of children was given an
avoidance FB task involving three locations (with two correct answers). Model 1 predicts that
children who pass the 3-location task are more likely to answer the Action question by referring
to the TB-Location than to the Neutral-Location. Model 2 predicts that passers in the 3-location
task will prefer the Neutral-Location over the TB-Location. A third possibility is that children
will show no bias and will either choose both of the correct locations or each of them half the
time. 
It is critical that we control for the falseness of the attributed belief. We therefore also
used a task in which the character again wants to avoid the frog but this time her belief about the
frog is true. However, there is a second frog which the character does not know about. We gave
this avoidance Partial Knowledge (control) task to another group of children. In this control task,
Sally sees a dirty frog under one box (TB-Location) but is absent when another dirty frog goes
under a second box (Ignorance-Location). A third location (Neutral-Location) remains empty. In
this task too the Action Question has two equally correct answers: Sally might go to the
Ignorance Location because she doesn’t know there is a frog there or to the empty Neutral-
Location. Neither model predicts a bias in this task because there is no false belief to generate a9
belief inhibition, leaving action to be determined by the desire inhibition alone. Take model 1 for
example: the desire inhibition is not cancelled out and so applies to the TB-Location, causing the
index to move away to either of two equally salient alternatives (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 about here
Prior findings led us to predict a model 1 type bias in the avoidance FB task. A striking
feature of the difficulty of avoidance FB tasks is that four-year-olds typically fail the Action
question even though they pass the Think question immediately before it. For model 1, despite
having already correctly calculated belief for the Think question, belief must be re-calculated
along with desire in order to answer the Action question. Re-calculation is necessary because
model 1 calculates belief and desire in parallel. For model 2, re-calculation is not necessary
because belief and desire are calculated serially; belief can be calculated once in response to the
Think question and then for the Action question desire identification is simply added to that
result. Leslie, German, and Polizzi (submitted) reasoned that only if belief is re-calculated along
with desire would it be possible to help children pass by using an ‘easier’ version of the Action
question. An easier version of the Action question is to ask  “Where will Sally look first?” —
three-year-old children perform better with this question in the approach FB task (Siegal &
Beattie, 1991; Surian & Leslie, 1999). Leslie, German, & Polizzi (submitted) found that in
avoidance FB five-year-olds indeed performed much better with the ‘look first’ Action question,
suggesting that, after a correct response to the Think question, they recalculated belief along
with desire. This effect is predicted by model 1, not by model 2.
Method
Materials
Each task made use of a foam board stage, and dolls and props used to enact the tasks. All props10
were changed between tasks, except for the stage.
 Procedure
Children who passed the screening task received either the avoidance FB task or the control task.
Both tasks concern Sally, who wants to put a clean hat under a box but not with a dirty frog. In
the avoidance FB task, Sally sees a frog under the middle box (FB-Location) of three boxes, but
is absent when the frog moves to another location (TB-Location). In the control task Sally sees a
frog under the middle box (TB-Location) of three boxes, but is absent when a second frog goes
under one of the other boxes (Ignorance-Location). The Appendix contains the protocols for both
tasks. 
In both tasks, side of locations was counterbalanced across subjects, and children were
asked the same Action Question, “Which box will Sally go to with her clean hat.” This question
has two equally correct answers. 
We only examined responses to the Action question for children who first passed a series
of Control Questions presented in fixed order. In the avoidance FB task the Control Questions
were:
Memory: In the beginning where did Sally see the dirty frog?
Reality: Where is the dirty frog now?
Think: Where does Sally think the dirty frog is?
In the control task the Control Questions were: 
Know 1: Does Sally know that there is a dirty frog under the blue box?
Know 2: Does Sally know that there is a dirty frog under the yellow box?
Subjects
Thirty-two out of forty-one children passed a standard FB task and were randomly assigned to11
receive either the avoidance FB task or the control task. To be included in the analysis, children
were also required to pass all questions in these tasks, except for the Action Question. Two
children in the avoidance FB task failed the Think question, and were rejected for that reason.
The remaining 30 children were aged between 4:8 and 8:7 (mean = 6:7, SD =  1:5). In the
avoidance FB task data was analyzed from 16 children aged between 4:9 and 8:7 (mean = 6:6,
SD = 1:6) and in the control task from 14 children aged between 4:8 and 8:7 (mean = 6:7, SD =
1:6).
Results
Because our predictions concern only successful performance, of greatest interest are the
responses of children who passed the Action Question. In the avoidance FB task, children were
biased toward one of the correct answers, namely, the TB-Location. Two children chose the
(incorrect) FB-Location. Of the 14 who passed, 13 children (93%) said the character would go to
the TB-Location, and one child indicated both the TB-Location and the Neutral-Location, whom
we conservatively scored as a Neutral responder (Binomial, N = 14, x =  1, p < 0.002, two-
tailed). All children passed the control task, seven (50%) indicating the Neutral-Location, six
(43%) choosing the Ignorance-Location, and one child indicating both the Neutral- and the
Ignorance-Location, whom we conservatively scored as an Ignorance responder. In this task,
there was no difference between the frequencies of children choosing either location (Binomial,
N =14, x = 6, p = 0.4, n.s.). Table 2 shows responses across the two tasks. Responding across the
two tasks differed significantly (Fisher’s Exact, p = 0.038, one-tailed). Although children were
free to do so, only 7% of children indicated both correct answers.
Table 2 about here12
Discussion
We found a bias in children’s belief-desire reasoning, using a task with two equally correct
answers. In approach FB tasks, there is a single correct answer because the character has a desire
to approach the target of false-belief. Tasks in which the character wishes to avoid the target of
false-belief can have two (or more) equally correct answers. Though subjects might have chosen
each location equally often, or responded with both correct answers, children who succeeded
were instead biased to select the TB-Location. Responding could not have been spatial in nature
because side of the TB-Location was counterbalanced across subjects. The bias was predicted by
model 1, but was opposite to that predicted by model 2.
We included a control task to investigate alternative explanations for a model 1 bias.
Suppose children simply prefer to select a location that currently contains an object over a
correct but empty location (‘object’ bias). Or suppose children prefer to select a correct location
that thwarts the character’s desire (‘failure’ or ‘irony’ bias). Either of these biases, like model 1,
favor the TB-Location. However, these other biases will also operate in the control task. The
control task is very similar to the avoidance FB task in that it also has two equally correct
answers to the Action question, namely, one location that contains a dirty frog and will defeat
the protagonist’s desire and one location that is empty. Again, the ‘object’ bias and the
‘failure/irony’ bias predict that children will favor the box containing a frog over the empty box.
However, children in the control task showed no bias, picking each correct answer equally often.
In contrast to the ‘object’ and ‘failure/irony’ biases, the model 1 bias is sensitive to the
character’s epistemic state. Model 1, therefore, makes differing predictions for the two tasks: a
TB-Location bias in the FB task and no bias in the control task (see Figure 3 for the model 1
mode of operation in the control task). To identify where Sally will go, first the target of true-13
belief and approach-desire — the TB-Location — is indexed. A desire inhibition (for avoidance)
is then applied to the TB-Location causing the index to shift to either the Ignorance- or Neutral-
Locations. Since neither of these locations has been inhibited, they should be selected with equal
probability.
Using two similar tasks, we observed bias only in the avoidance FB task and not in the
avoidance control task. The bias appears therefore to be related to the story character’s epistemic
state and not to extraneous biases. For children who succeed on avoidance FB tasks, attributing a
false-belief to a character creates a preference for predicting one course of action over another,
even though both are in fact equally likely. This finding is new, unexpected, and, whatever one’s
theoretical perspective, needs to be explained. 
From our perspective, belief-desire reasoning is a process of selecting contents for beliefs
and desires from among plausible alternatives. Selection of false-belief contents first requires
inhibition of a default true-belief attribution. When desire attribution also requires inhibition, the
two inhibitions interact, making the task difficult for younger children (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998;
Leslie, German, and Polizzi, submitted). We have now shown that this interaction also leads to a
selection bias in a 3-location task. These findings converge with those of Leslie, German and
Polizzi (submitted) in supporting the ‘inhibition of inhibition’ model of selection. Competent
reasoning about beliefs depends on the development of inhibitory control.14
Appendix.
Protocol for the avoidance false belief and control tasks.
This is Sally and look what she has. It’s a nice clean hat. Sally wants to put her clean hat away. So she
puts it down outside and she goes into this room to look for a box to put it under. And look there are three boxes
here. What color is this box? What color is this box? And what color is this box? Sally looks under the boxes. Is
there anything under the red box? No, nothing. And under the blue box? Nothing. And under the yellow box? It’s a
frog and it’s all dirty! Sally doesn’t want to put her clean hat with the dirty frog because she doesn’t want her hat to
get all dirty. 
Now Sally is going to go outside to get her clean hat, so she can put it under a box. Why does Sally not
want to put the clean hat with the dirty frog? Right, because she doesn’t want to get the hat all dirty. But look what
happens while Sally is gone…
Avoidance FB Task
The dirty frog hops from under the yellow box and
goes under the blue box! Did Sally see that? No!
Memory: In the beginning where did Sally see the
dirty frog?
Reality: Where is the dirty frog now?
Think: Where does Sally think the dirty frog is?
Action: Which box will Sally go to with her clean hat?
Control Task
Another dirty frog comes in the room. And it goes under
the blue box! Did Sally see that? No!
Know 1: Does Sally know that there is a dirty frog under
the blue box?
Know 2: Does Sally know that there is a dirty frog under
the yellow box?
Action: Which box will Sally go to with her clean hat?15
Table 1
Summary of previous findings on the development of belief-desire reasoning.
Check marks indicate typical pass performance, crosses typical failure.
Age
Task 3 ½ yrs 4 ½ yrs
avoidance True Belief T
a T
a,b
approach False Belief X‡ T‡
avoidance False Belief X 
c X
a,b,c
a Leslie, German, & Polizzi, submitted
b Leslie & Polizzi, 1998
c Cassidy, 1998
‡ standard finding in literature16
Table 2
Location selected in answering the Action question in the avoidance false belief and control
tasks. (Filled cells indicate incorrect answers.)
Avoidance False Belief Task
TB Neutral FB
13   (81%) 1   (6%) 2   (13%)
Control Task
Ignorance Neutral TB
8   (57%) 6   (43%) 0   (0%)17
Figure 1. . Two competing models of selection by inhibition in an avoidance false belief task. In both models, the
true-belief is initially more salient and attracts an index. In model 1, panel A, inhibitions for belief and desire cancel
out, leaving the true-belief to be selected as the target of action. In model 2, panel B, the belief inhibition is applied to
the true-belief causing the false-belief to become the more salient and to attract the index. A desire index is then
applied to the false-belief location and subsequently inhibited, causing the index to move back to the true-belief
location.18
Figure 2. . Two competing models of selection by inhibition in 3-location avoidance false belief tasks. In model 1,
panel A, the introduction of a third neutral location makes no difference to the outcome compared to a 2-location task,
because the belief and desire inhibitions continue to cancel out, leaving the true-belief location selected. In model 2,
panel B, the third neutral location will attract the index because in the end it is the only uninhibited location. A 3-
location task provides a way to distinguish between models because each model predicts a different bias.19
Figure 3. . When applied to an avoidance desire task in which a character knows about one frog under one box but does
not know about another frog under another box, model 1 predicts no bias in selecting either of two equally correct
answers.20
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